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Abstract – We devise a simple model to study the phenomenon of free-riding and the effect of free identities on user
behavior in peer-to-peer systems. At the heart of our model is a strategic user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private
parameter that reﬂects the user’s generosity. The user decides whether to contribute or free-ride based on how the current
burden of contributing in the system compares to her type. We derive the emerging cooperation level in equilibrium and
quantify the effect of providing free-riders with degraded service on the emerging cooperation. We ﬁnd that this penalty
mechanism is beneﬁcial mostly when the “generosity level” of the society (i.e., the average type) is low. To quantify the social
cost of free identities, we extendthe modelto accountfor dynamicscenarios with turnover(users joiningand leaving)andwith
whitewashers: users who strategically leave the system and re-join with a new identity. We ﬁnd that the imposition of penalty
on all legitimate newcomers incurs a signiﬁcant social loss only under high turnover rates in conjunction with intermediate
societal generosity levels.
1 Introduction
Whyisfree-riding so widespread among users of peer-to-peer (P2P)systems? Howcostly isitinterms of theperfor-
mance of the system? What mechanisms discourage free-riding? What is the social cost of cheap pseudonyms? What
is the tradeoff between tolerating whitewashers and penalizing newcomers in the presence of cheap pseudonyms?
These are the questions that motivate us.
P2P systems rely on voluntary contribution of resources from the individual participants. However, individual ra-
tionality results in free-riding behavior among peers, at the expense of collective welfare. Empirical studies have
shown prevalent free-riding in P2P ﬁle sharing systems [1, 16]. While it is possible that free-riding can be sustain-
able in equilibrium and may even occur as part of the socially optimal outcome [12], there has been signiﬁcant
interest in the design of incentive mechanisms to encourage cooperation in P2P systems [4, 6, 10, 13, 17].
In many of the proposed incentive schemes, rewards and/or punishments are handed out to peers according to their
contribution level. However, imposing penalties on free-riders require some means of identifying free-riders and
distinguishing them from contributors. Reputation systems [11, 14] may help, but these systems may be vulnerable
to the whitewashing attack, where a free-rider repeatedly re-joins the network under new identities to avoid the
penalty imposed on free-riders. The whitewashing attack is made feasible by the availability of low cost identities
or cheap pseudonyms [9]. There are two ways to counter whitewashing attacks. The ﬁrst is to require the use of free
but irreplaceable pseudonyms, e.g., through the assignment of strong identities by a central trusted authority [5].
In the absence of such mechanisms, it may be necessary to impose a penalty on all newcomers, including both
legitimate newcomers and whitewashers. This results in a social cost due to cheap pseudonyms, as demonstrated by
Friedman and Resnick [9].
We develop a simple modeling framework that helps to predict the level of free-riding in P2P systems. We use this
model to quantify the effect of a penalty mechanism, which gives free-riders degraded service, on the emerging
1cooperation level. We ﬁnd that the penalty mechanism is beneﬁcial mostly when the generosity level is low, and is
effective in discouraging free-riding behavior when the threat of penalty is sufﬁciently high relative to the cost of
contribution. To study the tradeoff between tolerating whitewashers and penalizing newcomers in the presence of
cheap pseudonyms, we extend the model to dynamic scenarios with turnover (users joining and leaving). We ﬁnd
that a signiﬁcant social cost (in the form of system performance loss) is incurred only under high turnover rates and
intermediate generosity levels.
2 Model
At the heart of our model is a user as a rational agent with a private and intrinsic characteristic called her type, a
single parameter reﬂecting the willingness of the agent to contribute (the agent’s type can be intuitively thought as
a qualitative measure of her decency or generosity).
Each user decides whether to contribute or free-ride based on how the current burden of contributing in the system
compares to her type. We assume that the cost of contributing is the inverse of the total percentage of contributors,
i.e.,
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Even within this minimalistic framework we can already see some interesting implications. In this “free market”
environment, the percentage
￿ of contributors is determined as the intersection of the type distribution with the
curve
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￿ (see Figure 1). Of the two intersection points, the higher one is the attractor of the natural ﬁxpoint
dynamics, i.e., starting at some initial
￿ , the agents arrive at their individual decisions, their aggregate decisions
deﬁne a new
￿ , and so on. As long as the initial
￿ is above the lower intersection point, the process will converge
to the upper one. If there is no intersection, i.e., when there are too many selﬁsh rascals around, then
￿ becomes
￿
(the other attractor, which always exists) and the system collapses.
So far we have been interested only in costs. What is a user’s beneﬁt when the level of contribution is
￿ ? We
assume that the beneﬁt a user receives from participation in the system (whether or not she contributes), denoted
by
￿ , is a function of the form
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , where
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ are positive constants. Hence user beneﬁt
is an increasing function of the number of contributors, but with diminishing returns—a form widely accepted in
this context (see, e.g., [2], [3], [15]). Thus, the performance of the system, denoted by
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difference between the average beneﬁt received by all users (including both contributors and free-riders) and the
average burden experienced by all users, which effectively include only the contributors (as free-riders incur no
burden):
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3 Contribution Level
A user’s type is a random variable with unknown distribution. For simplicity we take this distribution to be the
uniform distribution between
￿ and
￿
/
( .
￿
0
( is thus an important parameter of the system, as it reﬂects the society’s
“generosity” (it is twice the expected type).
To derive the contribution level
￿ (the percentage of users who contribute) we solve this ﬁxpoint equation:
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Figure 1: The intersection points of the two curves represent the two equilibria of the system. The curve
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General symbols
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￿
)
( maximal type in population
￿ system beneﬁt coefﬁcient
￿ diminishing returns coefﬁcient
￿ realized performance
￿ individual beneﬁt
￿ burden (individual contribution cost)
&
threat level
’ exclusion fraction
( penalty level
(
( maximal possible penalty
Static system
￿ contribution level
Dynamic system
￿
  contribution level of stayers
￿
￿
) contribution level of leavers
￿
+
* average contribution level
,
turnover rate
Table 1: This table presents the symbol notations in our model.
34 Penalty Mechanism
With the free market as baseline, we can consider different forms of intervention to discourage free-riding behavior.
Assuming that user behavior is observable even when user type is not, we can institute a penalty mechanism where
the users that are identiﬁed as free-riders are subject to a penalty. Since we are primarily interested in the incentive
effect of the mechanism rather than its implementation, we will consider, at an abstract level, a simple penalty
p that can be applied to the free-riders. We can interpret the value p as the probability that a free-rider can be
caught and excluded from the system. Alternatively, we can adopt a service differentiation interpretation [4, 11, 8],
where the free-riders receive a reduced beneﬁt of (1 - p)Q. Downgrading the beneﬁt of the free-riders increases
user contribution in two ways. First, the reduction in system load reduces the burden R imposed on the contributors.
Second, it introduces a threat, denoted by T; users know that they will received reduced service if they decide to
free-ride.
Under the penalty mechanism, the realized performance of contributors and free-riders is:
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Consequently, the contribution level,
￿ , is derived according to the following expression:
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In what follows, we set
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System performance now becomes:
￿
￿
&
￿
*
)
%
"
 
#
"
$
 
#
%
’
&
)
(
￿
2
￿
￿
￿
￿
-
￿
￿
6
2
3
￿
￿
￿
+
2
G
￿
-
￿
￿
6
2
G
￿
-
(
6
￿
6
and the optimal penalty level is:
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While
( yields a social beneﬁt due to the higher contribution level it achieves, it also incurs a social cost in the form
of reduced beneﬁt to free-riders. However, we identify the interesting case in which
( is set high enough such that
it achieves full cooperation (
￿
￿
￿
￿ ). If so, the penalty mechanism introduces no social cost since it only serves to
threaten users but no penalty is effectively imposed. In this case, we achieve the maximal beneﬁt (denoted by
￿
( )
and the maximal system performance as a result.
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The above results seem very optimistic; if we impose a high enough penalty, or are able to identify and exclude
free-riders with high probability, we achieve optimal system performance. However, these conclusions should be
4viewed with caution since they assume that the system designer has the freedom to set
( as high as desired. In
reality, it may be difﬁcult or costly to exclude free-riders with very high probability, so in many cases
( will be
restricted by a maximal feasible value, denoted by
(
( .
Figure 2 presents the percentile of optimal performance that can be achieved by the penalty mechanism for different
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On the other hand, if the penalty is set too low (e.g.,
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
’
￿ when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
’
￿ ), then the outcome is not signiﬁcantly
better than the free-market (
(
￿
￿ ) outcome.
An additional issue is the stability of the equilibrium. It is true that if
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5 The Social Cost of Free Identities
In Section 4, we show that a penalty mechanism can be effective in discouraging free-riding behavior. However,
the effectiveness of penalties can be undermined by the availability of cheap pseudonyms. In particular, a free-
rider might choose to whitewash, i.e., leave and re-join the network with a new identity on a repeated basis, to
avoid the penalty imposed on a free-rider. The lower the cost of acquiring new identities, the more likely a free-
rider will engage in whitewashing. Since whitewashers are indistinguishable from legitimate newcomers, it is not
possible to single them out for the imposition of a penalty. Of course, it is possible to counter the whitewashing
5x￿ l ￿ , x￿ s￿
whitewashers￿
d￿
(1-x￿ s￿  ￿ )￿ (1-d)￿
d￿
newcomers￿ departures￿
Figure 3: Dynamic system with arrivals, departures, and whitewashers. A fraction
￿ of users depart and are replaced by the
same number of newcomers. At the same time, a fraction
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strategy by imposing the penalty on all newcomers. However, this results in a social cost, as shown by Friedman
and Resnick [9].
In this section, we are interested in quantifying the social cost of cheap pseudonyms in terms of system performance
loss. We do so by extending our model from section 4 into a dynamic model with user joins and leaves. To quantify
the social loss due to cheap pseudonyms we consider two dynamic scenaria, namely, permanent identities (PI) and
free identities (FI).
Under PI, identity costs are taken to be inﬁnity, while under FI, they are costless 1. Therefore, these two cases
represent two extremes. In actuality, identity cost can take any positive ﬁnite value, and users decide whether to
whitewash or not depending on how the identity cost compares to the penalty imposed on free-riders and new-
comers. In this paper, we focus on the two extreme cases, as we believe they provide important insights while still
preserving some level of simplicity.
5.1 System Dynamics and Population Mixture
Wemodel a system withjoins and leaves, witha turnover rate of
,
(Figure 3).Weassume that arrivals and departures
are type-neutral and therefore do not alter the type distribution 2.
The population at each point in time is composed of the following four groups:
￿ existing contributors (EC)
￿ existing free-riders / whitewashers (EF/WW)
￿ new contributors (NC)
￿ new free-riders (NF)
The difference between the permanent and free identities scenaria is signiﬁed by the members of the second group.
While free-riders stay in the system if identities are permanent, they will adopt whitewashing behavior under free
identities. However, if penalty is imposed also on newcomers, free-riders are indifferent between staying or white-
washing.
5.2 Burden, Threat and Contribution Levels
An important property of the dynamic scenaria is that not all users care about the threat. The users who leave the
system at the end of each period are not affected by the penalty they would have paid had they stayed in the system.
Consequently, we get two separate contribution levels:
1Identity cost refers to the cost of acquiring any additional identity after the ﬁrst one, which is consideredto be a sunk cost.
2The model can be extended in future work by considering more sophisticated dynamics, as discussed in Section 6.
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Table 2: The respective fraction of users who get full and reduced beneﬁt with and without penalties to newcomers.
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The individual contribution cost (burden) in each period is determined by the ratio between the fraction of users
who get the full beneﬁt and those who get the reduced beneﬁt. If only the existing free-riders are penalized (feasible
only under PI), all groups except for the EF get the full service. However, if all newcomers are penalized, all groups
except for the ECget the reduced service. Table 5.2 presents the respective fraction of users who get full and reduced
beneﬁt under the two scenaria in steady state:
Based on this table, the burden under PI, when newcomers are not penalized is:
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Observe that the burden is lower under FI because a larger fraction of users are penalized, therefore the demand that
is placed on the system is lower. Nevertheless, the beneﬁts of all users, except for the EC, is also reduced. Observe
that under PI, if we set
( sufﬁciently high, we can get into the scenario where
( is used simply as a method to
threaten users but no penalty is effectively imposed (similar to the static system, see Section 4). In contrast, under
FI, imposing a penalty always results in a social loss because newcomers are effectively penalized, independent of
their behavior.
5.3 System Performance
The fraction in the population and realized performance level of each group under the two scenaria are presented
in Table5.3. System performance is
￿
 
"
 
%
’
&
)
(
8
￿
￿
￿
￿
2
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
6 , and the best strategy is to impose a penalty
(
￿ that
satisﬁes:
7Group (
￿ ) Group Size (
￿
￿
) Realized Performance (
￿
￿
)
Permanent identities Free identities
EC
2
G
￿
-
,
6
)
￿
￿
-
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
-
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
EF / WW
2
G
￿
-
,
6
2
G
￿
-
￿
6
￿
2
G
￿
-
(
6
￿
2
G
￿
-
(
6
NC
,
￿
￿
-
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
2
G
￿
-
(
6
-
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
NF
,
2
G
￿
-
￿
6
￿
￿
2
G
￿
-
(
6
Table 3: The size and realized performance level of the different groups under the PI and the FI scenaria.
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Figure 4 compares the system performance,
￿
 
"
 
%
’
&
)
( , subject to a penalty
(
￿
(
￿ , under PI and FI as a function of
￿
0
( for different turnover rates (
,
). We make the following observations:
￿ For very small turnover rates (
,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ), the system performs close to its optimal level since the threat is
imposed on the majority of the population, thus a small penalty level is sufﬁcient to achieve ahigh cooperation
level. If so, no notable performance gap exists between PI and FI. As the turnover increases, a higher penalty
is required, which incurs a social cost and reduces the system performance.
￿ As
￿
0
( increases, system performance converges to its optimal performance level under both scenaria. Thus,
the performance gap between the two scenaria shrinks.
￿ Under a high turnover rate (
,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ) and low
￿
/
( values, the system performs better if penalty is imposed on
newcomers even under PI. In cases where the generosity level is low and the turnover rate is high, it is hard
to obtain satisfactory cooperation levels, and penalties to newcomers, although incurring a social loss, may
help improve the cooperation level by reducing the load placed on the system.
We conclude that a notable social cost due to free identities is incurred only under speciﬁc conditions, in which a
penalty on all newcomers is unnecessarily imposed. In particular, it is incurred only under high turnover rates (
,
)
and only in conjunction with intermediate generosity levels (
￿
$
( ) and low system beneﬁts (
￿ ). In contrast, in cases
where the system can tolerate the newcomers, the imposition of penalty on all newcomers incurs a social loss. In
what follows, we provide some observations that help explain these ﬁndings:
8￿ If the turnover rate is low, the fraction of newcomers in the population is small. Therefore, penalizing new-
comers does not have a big impact on the system performance. In addition, because the population is fairly
permanent, a low
( imposes a sufﬁcient threat to obtain high cooperation.
￿ If the turnover rate is high and the societal generosity level is low, system collapse can only be avoided by
reducing the demand placed on the system. Assessing a penalty on all newcomers is one method to limit the
demand. Therefore, in these situations, not only does penalizing newcomers not incur a net social loss, but it
helps to sustain the system by reducing the load enough to avoid system overloading.
￿ If the societal generosity level is high, a high cooperation level is obtained even in the absence of intervention.
Therefore, the best policy under both scenaria is to impose an extremely small penalty or no penalty at all.
Hence, no notable social loss is incurred due to free identities.
￿ If the beneﬁts of the system (
￿ ) are high, even a small
( results in a high threat that is imposed on free-riders.
Once again, the optimal
( will be very small, thus no notable gap will occur.
6 Discussion and Future Work
We have presented an economic model of user behavior in peer-to-peer systems, and derived some useful observa-
tions. In particular, a mechanism that penalizes free-riders can improve system performance by reducing the burden
placed on the contributors. This mechanism is especially effective when the societal generosity level is low,in which
case the system exhibits low or zero performance level in the absence of intervention. Additionally, penalizing all
newcomers may be effective in discouraging whitewashing behavior and will incur a social cost (in the form of
reduced system performance) only for high levels of turnover rates and in conjunction with low system beneﬁts and
intermediate societal generosity levels.
Our model is ﬂexible enough to account for a diverse set of characteristics. For example, we extend our model to
account for heterogeneity with respect to resources. To do so, we split each user to a number of virtual users that
is proportional to the amount of resources he has. We ﬁnd that users with many resources bear a higher burden,
therefore exhibit lower contribution levels. Because contribution from high-resources users is more valuable in
terms of system performance, a heterogeneous system results in a lower system performance than a homogeneous
system. However, if the amount of resources and the generosity level of users correlate, a heterogeneous system may
result in better performance than a homogeneous one. Several research questions arise in this context as discussed
below.
Unlike many works in this area, we are not proposing a new protocol or incentive scheme, neither do we specify any
implementation details. Instead, the objective of this work is to develop a game theoretic framework that helps to
gain insights into the effect of incentives schemes on user behavior and system performance, and to obtain a better
understanding of the impact of the different factors and system parameters on the need and effectiveness of these
schemes. For this purpose, we have simpliﬁed the model with a set of somewhat restrictive assumptions. In future
work, we plan to relax or modify some of the assumptions and possibly extend the model in several directions:
￿ Additional incentive schemes. We plan to analyze the effect of system partitioning on user behavior and
system performance. In particular, if the system is partitioned into two or more sub-systems that impose
different penalties on their free-riders, how would it effect the results?
￿ Additional penalty forms. Consider other forms of penalty to newcomers. One candidate is entry fee that can
be used as a pure transfer to the system. Some examples are monetary payments which can be distributed
among the participants or entry fees in the form of contribution of resources. These mechanisms entail no
direct loss in efﬁciency, but introduce a different set of issues. First, this type of mechanism essentially
forces contribution at the entering stage, and may therefore prevent some users from participating. Second,
9contribution of resources from newcomers prior to their participation may be limited because in many cases
the resources are gathered while being members. Third, redistribution of monetary payments may be difﬁcult
due to the highly dynamic membership in these systems.
￿ Type distribution. It would be interesting to derive general results for various user type distributions. One
particular distribution to consider would be a bimodal distribution which is uniform between
￿ and
￿
( , but
has two spikes at the extremes.
￿ System dynamics (Section 5). In the dynamic scenario, the model can be extended by assuming (1) departure
rates that depend on performance, (2) arrival rates affected by
( , and (3) dynamics that affect the distribution
by postulating type-dependent departures and arrivals. In particular, one could imagine that
( would affect
arrival rate in different directions. On the one hand, imposing penalty on newcomers may discourage them
from joining the system, which will reduce arrivals. On the other hand, users who join a system that penal-
izes its users may have expectations for higher performance levels. Hence, it may attract users even more.
Depending on the effect of
( on arrival rate, the social loss due to free identities may increase or decrease
relative to our results.
￿ Identity costs. In our analysis we consider the two extreme cases of inﬁnite and zero identity costs. In future
work, we intend to study cases in which the cost of identity,
￿ , is a positive ﬁnite value. In this context, impos-
ing different penalties on free-riders and newcomers may be beneﬁcial (e.g.,
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￿ Additional performance metrics. In this paper we use the metric of system performance. This metric assigns
equal weights to the realized performance of all users, whether they are contributors or free-riders. In the
future, we plan to consider other performance metrics that might be more appropriate on grounds of fairness.
One natural metric is one that assigns more weight to the performance of contributors than the performance
experienced by free-riders.
￿ Resource heterogeneity. Several interesting directions can be examined in the context of resource heterogene-
ity. First, how do the results change if users can elect to contribute some amount of resources as opposed to
the binary decision assumed here. Second, it will be interesting to experiment with alternative contribution
cost functions that may be more reﬂective of the opportunity cost. For example, users with high resources
may experience lower opportunity costs even when they contribute more resources [7]. If so, the system may
exhibit better performance.
References
[1] ADAR, E., AND HUBERMAN, B. A. Free Riding on Gnutella. First Monday 5, 10 (October 2000).
[2] ASVANUND, A., CLAY, K., KRISHNAN, R., AND SMITH, M. An Empirical Analysis of Network Externalities in Peer-
to-Peer Music Sharing Networks. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS)
(December 2003).
[3] BRESLAU, L., CAO, P., FAN, L., PHILLIPS, G., AND SHENKER, S. Web-CachingandZipf-likeDistributions:Evidence
and Implications. In Proceedings of Infocom (1999).
[4] BURAGOHAIN, C., AGRAWAL, D., AND SURI, S. A Game-Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems. In
International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (Sep 2003).
[5] CASTRO, M., DRUSCHEL, P., GANESH, A., ROWSTRON, A., AND WALLACH, D. S. Security for Structured Peer-to-
Peer Overlay Networks. In Proceedings of Multimedia Computing and Networking 2002 (MMCN ’02) (2002).
[6] CROWCROFT, J., GIBBENS, R., KELLY, F., AND ˘ OSTRING, S. Modeling Incentives for Collaboration in Mobile Ad
Hoc Networks. In Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (2003).
10[7] FELDMAN, M., LAI, K., CHUANG, J., AND STOICA, I. Quantifying Disincentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks. In 1st
Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (2003).
[8] FELDMAN, M., LAI, K., STOICA, I., AND CHUANG, J. Robust Incentive Techniques for Peer-to-Peer Networks. In
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’04) (May 2004).
[9] FRIEDMAN, E., AND RESNICK, P. The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms. Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy 10, 2 (1998), 173–199.
[10] GOLLE, P., LEYTON-BROWN, K., MIRONOV, I., AND LILLIBRIDGE, M. Incentives For Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Net-
works. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, October 2001 (2001).
[11] KAMVAR, S. D., SCHLOSSER, M. T., AND GARCIA-MOLINA, H. The EigenTrust Algorithm for Reputation Manage-
ment in P2P Networks. In Proceedings of the Twelfth International World Wide Web Conference (May 2003).
[12] KRISHNAN, R., SMITH, M., TANG, Z., AND TELANG, R. The Virtual Commons: why Free-Riding can be Tolerated in
Peer-to-Peer Networks. In Worshop on Information Systems and Economics (December 2003).
[13] MICHIARDI, P., AND MOLVA, R. A Game Theoretical Approach to Evaluate Cooperation Enforcement Mechanisms in
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. In Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (2003).
[14] NOWAK, M. A., AND SIGMUND, K. Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring. Nature 393 (1998), 573–577.
[15] SAROIU, S., GUMMADI, K. P., DUNN, R. J., GRIBBLE, S. D., AND LEVY, H. M. An Analysis of Internet Content
Delivery Systems. In Proceedings of Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (2002).
[16] SAROIU, S., GUMMADI, P. K., AND GRIBBLE, S. D. A Measurement Study of Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Systems. In
Proceedings of Multimedia Computing and Networking 2002 (MMCN ’02) (2002).
[17] URPI, A., BONUCCELLI, M., AND GIORDANO, S. Modeling Cooperation in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: a Formal
Description of Selﬁshness. In Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (2003).
11